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13 
VOLK V. DEMEERLEER: AN UNPRINCIPLED DIVORCE 
OF DANGEROUSNESS AND THE TARASOFF DUTY TO 
PROTECT 
Jaclyn Greenberg* 
Abstract: Since its inception in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of the California, the 
duty to protect third parties imposed on mental health professionals (MHPs) has been the 
subject of considerable scrutiny. Clinicians and legal scholars alike derided the original duty 
to protect “anyone foreseeable” as unworkable—undermining the therapeutic relationship 
and placing MHPs in the impossible position of having to predict their patients’ violent 
future. Over time, case law and legislation narrowed the duty to something less problematic: 
a “duty to warn” identifiable victims who face imminent threat of serious harm. 
However, Volk v. DeMeerleer, reset the duty for Washington MHPs to its original 
expansiveness, and arguably broadened the basis for imposing the duty. The decision 
effectively marries the duty to the mere presence of a therapeutic relationship, and divorces it 
from a patient’s dangerousness—the objective criteria this Article argues is an implicit and 
necessary component of the duty. Dangerousness is not only a reasonable basis upon which 
to trigger the duty to protect, it also embodies the crucial development in mental health law 
that a mentally ill person’s rights cannot be curtailed absent due process. This Article argues 
that Volk effectively denies the need for objective criteria to trigger the duty and, as a result, 
is legally unsupportable as well as practically unworkable. Worst of all, Volk undermines the 
legalist approach to mental health laws which arose in response to the repugnant presumption 
that a mentally ill person necessarily threatens the public’s safety. This Article first traces the 
rise of rights-based mental health laws and the role of dangerousness, as well as the origin of 
the duty to protect. Second, it reviews trends in the duty to protect case law and legislation to 
identify the implicit role that dangerousness played in limiting Tarasoff. It further reflects on 
how dangerousness, although flawed, represents the best option for mediating the tension 
between honoring the rights of mentally ill persons and protecting society. Finally, this 
Article sets out the facts and rulings of Volk, concluding with a call for legislative reform. 
Absent a course correction, the decision invites a return to the false notion that mentally ill 
persons are inherently dangerous. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The American justice system has long struggled with how best to 
reconcile the rights of persons with mental illnesses and the need to 
protect society from the few persons whose illnesses make them 
dangerous to others. In the latter half of the twenty-first century, mental 
health laws have resembled a fast moving pendulum, swinging from a 
paternalistic, professional discretion-based model toward a legalist, 
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rights-based one which demands that intervention be objectively 
justified.1 Nowhere is this more evident than in the civil commitment 
process: whereas once all that was required to hospitalize someone 
involuntarily was an expert belief in the “need for treatment,” today 
most laws require a determination that the patient presents a danger to 
himself or others.2 Due process does not permit intervention otherwise.3 
Meanwhile, mental health policy has moved swiftly toward providing 
the mentally ill with the “least restrictive” care possible.4 In all, the legal 
system has recognized that persons suffering from mental illness are no 
less deserving of freedom from state interference than any others absent 
exceptional circumstances, namely a violent threat to others. 
Tangled up with these developments is the mental healthcare system. 
It is the vehicle by which the state can realize its ambition to draw the 
appropriate line between honoring the autonomy of the mentally ill and 
intervening when necessary. The mental healthcare system—referring to 
psychiatry, psychology, social work and related fields, and those who 
practice in these areas—provides the basis for courts and other state 
actors to lawfully intervene in someone’s life on the basis of their mental 
status. Mental health professionals, therefore, play a crucial dual role in 
society: treating our most mentally-disordered citizens while also 
evaluating their potential to endanger the public.5 These professionals 
distinguish the ill from the ill and dangerous. 
Since the mid-1970s, when the California Supreme Court released its 
landmark decisions, Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,6 the 
                                                      
* LLM Candidate, Center for Law, Science & Global Health, University of Washington. I would 
like to thank Taya Briley for introducing me to this important topic and Terry Price for his support 
in the preparation of this Article. All errors and omissions remain my own. 
1. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Contemporary Social Historical Perspectives on Mental Health 
Reform, 10 J.L. & SOC’Y 47, 47–48 (1983). 
2. See Sara Gordon, The Danger Zone: How the Dangerousness Standard in Civil Commitment 
Proceedings Harms People with Serious Mental Illness, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 657, 668–69 
(2016). 
3. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
4. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL § 1-2.1.1 (3d ed. 2016). 
5. See Fay Anne Freedman, The Psychiatrist’s Dilemma: Protect the Public or Safeguard 
Individual Liberty?, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV 255, 256 (1988) (referring to these responsibilities 
as the “dual duty of protecting others, while effectively treating patients”). 
6. Referring to both Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal, 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974) (en banc) 
(creating a “duty to warn”) and Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) 
(creating a “duty to protect”). As discussed below, the separate rulings of the two decisions are 
often conflated when they ought not to be. Unless otherwise stated, when this Article refers to 
Tarasoff, the reference is to the 1976 decision. 
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corollary to this awesome responsibility was a legal obligation—and 
source of liability—to protect third parties from a violent patient.7 This 
“duty to protect” raised three broad questions: when is the duty 
triggered; to whom is the duty owed; how is the duty fulfilled. Over the 
last forty years, courts and lawmakers have answered these questions, 
sometimes more precisely than others. Today, the duty to protect most 
commonly arises when a patient threatens an identifiable victim; the 
duty is owed to the known or knowable victim; and appropriate action 
may include initiating commitment proceedings (voluntary or 
involuntary), informing the authorities or others, or warning the intended 
victim.8 
Gruesome crimes, however, continue to spur litigation to test these 
boundaries—lest it appear that victims are without recourse. Consider 
the recent Washington State Supreme Court case, Volk v. DeMeerleer.9 
In Volk, a psychiatrist was sued after one of his outpatients killed his ex-
girlfriend and one of her sons.10 The victims’ family alleged that the 
psychiatrist failed to protect the victims, although the patient never 
voiced any threats about them to the psychiatrist nor, for that matter, 
expressed any general homicidal ideations in the six years leading up to 
the crime.11 The Court ruled that the psychiatrist owed a broad duty to 
protect “all foreseeable victims,”12 effectively erasing the duty to warn 
“identifiable victims” developed by courts and state legislatures. 
In this Article, I argue that Volk’s application of the duty to protect 
“anyone foreseeable” (the “Volk duty”) divorces dangerousness from the 
duty. The effect re-casts the objective criteria as a descriptor of a 
person’s state of mind rather than what it actually is—a legal construct 
designed to install a minimum level of due process into state interference 
in the lives of the mentally ill. The decision is legally unsupportable, 
practically unworkable for therapists,13 and worst of all, contradicts the 
legalist approach adopted in response to a repugnant policy of presuming 
the presence of a threat based simply on the existence of mental illness 
                                                      
7. See Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 427, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (1983). 
8. See Hafemeister et al., infra note 59, at 78; Slowbogin et al., infra note 67; Soulier et al. infra 
note 80, at 458. 
9. 187 Wash. 2d 241, 386 P.3d 254 (2016). 
10. Id. at 250, 386 P.3d at 260. 
11. Id. at 250–51, 386 P.3d at 260. 
12. Id. at 256, 386 P.3d at 263. 
13. Referring to the broad swath of mental health professionals included under the umbrella term 
“mental health professionals,” including psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric advanced 
registered nurse practitioners, psychiatric nurses, social workers and such other professionals as 
may be subject to state mental health laws. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 70.05.020(30) (2016). 
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and nothing more. 
First, contrary to precedent and related statutes, the Volk duty denies 
the necessity of: (1) a threat; (2) to a discernible victim; (3) by a patient 
who is under a degree of control by the therapist, either by context (i.e., 
hospitalization) or circumstance (warranting hospitalization). Put 
another way, it requires a therapist to take steps to protect the public 
from their patient regardless of whether he14 presents an identifiable 
danger to others.15 The concept of foreseeability is reduced to a mere 
forecast and the effect directly contradicts state and federal privacy laws. 
Second, the Volk duty is unworkable on numerous fronts: it bifurcates 
a therapist’s obligations depending on whether the patient is obtaining 
treatment in the inpatient or outpatient context, with less protection 
against third party liability in the latter context despite less control over 
the patient; it pits therapists’ interests against their patients’ interests, 
undermining the therapeutic relationship; and ultimately it places 
therapists in a catch-22: face third party liability for prioritizing a 
patient’s rights and interests at the expense of taking steps to protect a 
potential (unknown) third party or, face malpractice liability for 
prioritizing the rights of a potential (unknown) third party by violating 
privacy laws and/or seeking unlawful confinement. 
Finally, and I argue most troublingly, the Volk duty wholly 
undermines the legalist, rights-based model embraced to uphold the 
dignity and autonomy of the mentally ill. It shifts the locus of action 
away from objective-based criteria—the dangerousness standard—back 
toward a professional, discretion-oriented model of decision-making. 
This yank of the pendulum is justified as necessary to protect society. 
However, that justification ignores the fact that the contest between 
discretion and legalism already happened and resulted in the 
development and institution of the requirements now set to be ignored, 
and it does so at the expense of those who are mentally ill and not 
dangerous. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, it traces the rise of rights-
based mental health laws and the recognition of due process for the 
mentally ill, emphasizing the role that dangerousness played in 
cementing the new order. Tarasoff and the origin of the duty to protect is 
then discussed. Second, it identifies trends in the case law and legislative 
history surrounding the duty to protect to identify the implicit role that 
                                                      
14. Rather than using the phrase “he or she,” this Article alternates between using the pronoun 
“he” or “she” for the sake of brevity. 
15. Volk, 187 Wash. 2d at 266, 386 P.3d at 268.  
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dangerousness played in limiting the original broad reach of Tarasoff. In 
light of those trends, this Article reflects on how dangerousness, 
although flawed, represents the best option for mediating the tension 
between honoring the rights of individuals and protecting society. 
Finally, this Article sets out the facts and rulings of Volk, detailing the 
analysis briefly set out above. It concludes by calling for legislative 
reform. Absent a course correction, Volk invites a return to the false 
notion that the mentally ill are inherently dangerous. The patients’ rights 
movement will be undermined, and we will be doomed to repeat the 
mistake of conflating the presence of mental illness with threats to 
society once again. 
I.  THE BIRTH OF RIGHTS-BASED MENTAL HEALTH LAWS, 
THE DANGEROUSNESS STANDARD, AND THE DUTY TO 
PROTECT 
A. The Rise of Rights-Based Mental Health Laws and the 
Development of the Dangerousness Standard 
Historically, society treated mental illness as a “defect,” and afflicted 
individuals were considered “menaces,” “deviant[s],” and persons from 
whom society needed protection.16 In the first half of the twentieth 
century, few procedural protections stood between them and involuntary 
hospitalization or “civil commitment.”17 As such, commitment was 
indeterminate, based on vague but broad statutory language (e.g., “social 
menace”), and it captured many who posed no threat to society other 
than being different.18 The basis for state intervention was two-fold: the 
state’s police power and its parens patriae jurisdiction.19 The latter 
created the state’s obligation to care for those who could not care for 
themselves; the former required the state to protect the interests of its 
citizens. Broad authority under the police power was established early 
on when the United States Supreme Court ruled that it was a 
“fundamental principle that ‘persons . . . are subject to all kinds of 
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health and 
                                                      
16. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205–06 (1927); see also BRUCE A. ARRIGO, PUNISHING THE 
MENTALLY ILL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 6 (2002); John V. Jacobi, Mental 
Health and Other Behavioral Health Services, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, 7 
(I. Glenn Cohen et al., eds., 2016).  
17. ARRIGO, supra note 16, at 6. 
18. See generally ARRIGO, supra note 16.  
19. Gordon, supra note 2, at 6. 
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prosperity of the State.’”20 Though established in the public health 
immunization context, the principle that individuals’ rights were 
subordinate to the interests of society was quickly applied to justify the 
curtailment of mentally ill persons’ liberty rights.21 
Indeed, states drafted civil commitment statutes as a means of 
protecting others as much as the ill themselves.22  Hospitalization was 
viewed as a necessary act of paternalism: all that was initially required 
was the existence of a mental illness or “disorder,” which was vaguely 
defined,23 and a physician’s recommendation that treatment at a 
psychiatric hospital was “necessary.”24 The laws effectively 
institutionalized trust in professional opinion, which was characterized 
as “clinical judgment” in the case of psychiatry but, as noted by Larry 
Gostin, boiled down to a heavy dose of “personal intuition and 
subjective judgment.”25 These early laws were silent on the topic of 
rights; the concept of what was “just” for persons with mental illness 
was limited to the provision of care—care as the state saw fit.26 Further, 
the consequences of the presence of a mental illness (e.g., whether an 
actual threat existed to the person or to others) were immaterial. 
Unsurprisingly, this period of mental healthcare has been critiqued as an 
exercise in social control,27 laden with abuse of psychiatry’s codified 
power.28 
Beginning in the 1960s, there was an explosion of development in 
mental health law which shifted the legal framework governing the 
mentally ill away from enshrining the professional discretion of those 
empowered by the law towards instituting procedural protections for 
those subject to it.29 Among the developments attributed to this shift was 
                                                      
20. Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25–26 (1905) (quoting Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. 
Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877)). 
21. See Buck v. Bell, 274 US 200, 205–07 (1927) (where the Court, relying on Jacobson, 
affirmed a judgment ordering a mentally “disabled” woman to be sterilized pursuant to a Virginia 
law that permitted the procedure in “mental defectives” on the basis, among others, that it would 
promote the welfare of society). 
22. See Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 
1222–23 (1974) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 4, § 3-1; 
Gordon, supra note 2, at 664. 
23. Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1222. 
24. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 665. 
25. Gostin, supra note 1, at 56. 
26. Jaclyn Greenberg, A Right of Appeal Under Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act: A Paper 
Victory is No Victory at All, 44 OTTAWA L. REV. 433, 440 (2013). 
27. See e.g., ARRIGO, supra note 16, at 75–76. 
28. Gostin, supra note 1, at 55–56. 
29. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 4, at 6–10; Gostin, supra note 1, at 47–48.  
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the National Institute of Mental Health’s creation of a model civil 
commitment statute, the Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the 
Mentally Ill (“Draft Act”).30 It set out two grounds for involuntarily 
hospitalizing someone, namely, the “likelihood that the individual will 
injure himself or [injure] others if he is not confined.”31 The Draft Act 
caught fire quickly: as of 1961, only five of the thirty-seven states that 
had procedures in place for involuntary hospitalization contained a legal 
test requiring that the mentally ill person be “dangerous;”32 by 1971, that 
number increased to nine;33 by 1974, of the forty-five jurisdictions that 
had emergency involuntary commitment provisions, thirty-eight required 
that the individual appear “dangerous to themselves or others.”34 The 
dramatic uptick in revisions to commitment statutes reflected a “trend 
towards restricting involuntary civil commitment to the dangerous 
mentally ill and toward limiting the type and increasing the severity of 
harm necessary to support a finding of dangerousness.”35 Further, the 
laws installed in a previously unchecked system a minimum level of 
scrutiny, subjecting the commitment process to judicial oversight from 
the outset.36 
A series of landmark cases in the 1970s recognizing mentally ill 
persons’ due process rights cemented this new legalism-oriented 
landscape. It began with Lessard v. Schmidt,37 a 1972 federal district 
court decision which held that Wisconsin’s civil commitment statute was 
constitutional only if it was construed to require that there was “an 
extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do 
immediate harm to himself or others.”38 Further, proof of dangerousness 
must include a “finding of a recent overt act, attempt, or threat to do 
substantial harm to oneself or another.”39 That same year, the United 
States Supreme Court ruled in Jackson v. Indiana40 that it was a 
                                                      
30. National Institute of Mental Health, A Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill 
(Public Health Service Pub. No. 51. 1952). 
31. Id. at 28 (commentary). 
32. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 4, § 3-5. 
33. Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1205. 
34. Id. at 1204. 
35. Id. at 1205. 
36. National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 30, at vii (Foreword). 
37. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific order, 414 
U.S. 473, order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).  
38. Id. at 1093.  
39. Id.  
40. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).  
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violation of due process to involuntarily commit a criminally-accused 
person for an indefinite period solely on the basis of his incompetence to 
stand trial. The Court reasoned that the statute authorizing detention 
where it was in the interests of the welfare of “the person or . . . others” 
required a finding of dangerousness.41 The Court held that there must be 
a reasonable relationship between the purpose of civil commitment and 
the nature and duration of commitment.42 In so doing, Justice Blackmun 
observed: “[c]onsidering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps 
remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on this [police] 
power have not been more frequently litigated.”43 
Three years later, the Court affirmed the necessity of a finding of 
dangerousness in the seminal case, O’Connor v. Donaldson.44 Kenneth 
Donaldson was committed to a Florida state hospital, on petition from 
his father, and told he would be there for a few weeks but ended up 
committed for nearly fifteen years.45 He repeatedly challenged his 
commitment, each time denied with little explanation.46 Donaldson 
alleged that his therapists intentionally and maliciously deprived him of 
his constitutional right to liberty, on the grounds that they had the ability 
to release him if he was not a danger to himself or others—which he was 
not—but refused to exercise their discretion.47 The central issue on 
appeal dealt with the therapists’ good faith intentions for continuing 
Donaldson’s commitment absent a finding of dangerousness, which gave 
the Court cause to consider the constitutional authority for confinement 
of a non-dangerous person.48 The Court unanimously decided that a state 
could not constitutionally confine someone who was “nondangerous” 
and capable of living safely in the community “without more.”49 
                                                      
41. Id. Another lesser-known case from the same year, Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), 
added weight to the message. In that case, the Court interpreted a Wisconsin statute governing sex 
crimes as violating the equal protection clause because persons committed under that act were not 
permitted a jury determination whereas those committed under a mental health statute were. The 
Court held that the statute required a “social and legal judgment that [the mentally ill person’s] 
potential for doing harm . . . to others [is] great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of 
liberty.” Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 509. 
42. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. 
43. Id. at 737. 
44. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
45. Id. at 564. 
46. Id. at 565. 
47. Id. at 567–68. 
48. Id. at 570–78. 
49. Id. at 576. For a more recent example, see Boller v. State, 775 So. 2d 408, 409–10 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000) (ruling that it was unconstitutional to commit a woman who refused to take her 
psychotropic medication, in spite of her mental deterioration). 
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B. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California and the 
Development of the Duty to Protect 
Around the time that the Court was strengthening the legal protections 
of the mentally ill in O’Connor, victims of violence by mentally ill 
persons won legal protection in the famous California Supreme Court 
case, Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.50 The decision sent 
shockwaves through the mental healthcare community when it departed 
from the general rule that no person has a duty to protect a third party 
from harming another,51 to rule that psychotherapists, including 
psychiatrists, have a duty to protect “foreseeable victims” of their 
patients’ violent actions.52 
The Tarasoff facts are well known: a college student murdered a 
woman he was obsessed with after he told his therapist he intended to do 
so.53 The student never identified the woman but the therapist could have 
learned her identity.54 In any event, the therapist reported the student to 
campus police and urged them to have the student committed.55 After 
interviewing the student and obtaining his promise to stay away from the 
woman, the police declined to do so.56 The therapist’s supervisor 
demanded that the police return the therapist’s letter urging commitment, 
and told the therapist to destroy his notes and take no further action.57 
No one warned the woman or her parents, and two months later, the 
student murdered her.58 The parents sued the therapists, among others, 
alleging that they were negligent in failing to (1) detain a dangerous 
patient; (2) warn the victim or those who could inform her; and (3) 
generally protect the victim from the student’s “dangerous 
propensities.”59 
The California Supreme Court ruled on the case twice—a fact that 
continues to muddy the literature and jurisprudence on the precise nature 
and content of the duty.60 Many consider Tarasoff to have established a 
                                                      
50. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
51. Id. at 385. 
52. Id. at 334.  
53. Id. at 339. 
54. Id. at 432. 
55. Id.  
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 341. 
58. Id. at 339–40. 
59. Id. at 341–42. 
60. See Thomas L. Hafemeister et al., Parity at a Price: The Emerging Professional Liability of 
Health Providers, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 76–77 (2013); Derek Truscott, The Psychotherapist’s 
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“duty to warn,” when in fact it created a broader “duty to protect.” The 
first decision, released in 1974, did establish that therapists had a duty to 
warn their patients’ foreseeable victims.61 That ruling provoked a swift, 
organized response from the mental health community culminating in 
the submission of an amicus curiae brief to the Court setting out their 
concerns, namely that the ruling would require therapists to breach 
patients’ privacy rights (potentially destroying the therapeutic alliance), 
and highlighting the limitations on therapists’ ability to predict 
dangerousness (thus holding these professionals to an impossible 
standard).62 The Court agreed to review the case but the result arguably 
created a much broader scope of liability. 
In its second decision, released in 1976, the California Supreme Court 
created a duty to protect, holding: 
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his 
profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious 
danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use 
reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such 
danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to 
take one or more of various steps, depending on the nature of the 
case. Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or 
others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the 
police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessarily 
under the circumstances.63 
The duty to protect requires whatever steps are necessary under the 
circumstances, which could simply include warning the intended victim, 
but likely more when no victim is identified.64 Some have argued that 
the first case left such a lasting (and alarming) impression that the true 
precedent never sunk in.65 It is equally plausible that the prevalence of 
the “duty to warn” can be attributed to the fact that the defendant 
therapists had immunity from their failure to commit the student,66 
leaving only their failure to warn as a potential valve of liability. Further, 
subsequent California decisions limited the scope of the duty (to protect) 
                                                      
Duty to Protect: An Annotated Bibliography, 21 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 221, 222 (1993). 
61. Tarasoff, 529 P.2d at 553. 
62. James C. Beck, The Therapist’s Legal Duty When the Patient May Be Violent, 11 
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 665, 667 (1988). 
63. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340. 
64. Id.  
65. See Beck, supra note 62, at 668; Hafemeister et al., supra note 60, at 77–78. 
66. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 351 (referencing CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 856 (West 2017)). 
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to readily identifiable victims.67 
The basis for establishing the duty to protect chiefly rested on the 
“special relationship” between the therapist and the patient, as well as 
the foreseeability of the victim. Notwithstanding the imprecise nature of 
the concept of foreseeability,68 the Tarasoff majority declared that it was 
the most important consideration in establishing the existence of a 
duty.69 It relied on section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to 
support its ruling, holding: 
When the avoidance of foreseeable harm requires a defendant to 
control the conduct of another person, or to warn of such 
conduct, the common law has traditionally imposed liability 
only if the defendant bears some special relationship to the 
dangerous person. . . . Since the relationship between a therapist 
and his patient satisfies this requirement, we need not here 
decide whether foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty 
to exercise reasonable care to protect a potential victim of 
another’s conduct.70 
Section 315 is an exception to the general rule that no one owes a duty to 
protect a third party from harming another.71 It states: 
A person has a duty to control the conduct of a third person and 
thereby to prevent physical harm to another if: 
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third 
person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third 
person’s conduct, or 
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other 
which gives to the other a right to protection.72 
Section 315 has been interpreted as requiring a relationship to be 
“definite, established and continuing,” and as containing some degree of 
                                                      
67. See, e.g., Thompson v. Cty. of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980) (in which the California 
Supreme Court narrowed Tarasoff in ruling that therapists’ duty to third parties is contingent on 
their patients threatening an identifiable victim; and that, therapists did not have a duty to warn a 
victim of a patient with a history of violence who had made nonspecific threats and was due to be 
released from confinement); Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1980). 
68. CHRISTOPHER SLOWBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 210 (6th ed., 2014) (the foreseeability criteria, although a widely-accepted 
benchmark in determining liability is a “decidedly imprecise standard that nevertheless extends 
professional liability beyond the limits set by the privity doctrine”). 
69. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342. 
70. Id. at 342–43. 
71. Id. at 345. 
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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control by the defendant over a third party.73 
The California Supreme Court observed that the exception arises 
where the defendant “stands in some special relationship to either the 
person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the 
foreseeable victim of that conduct.”74 It provided two examples of where 
this special relationship would give rise to affirmative duties for the 
benefit of third parties: a hospital that controls a patient who may 
endanger others would be required to take reasonable measures to 
control the behavior of that patient (e.g., it would be negligent of a 
mental hospital to permit the escape or release of a dangerous patient), 
and a doctor who prescribes medication to a patient that renders the 
patient a danger to others would need to warn the patient of the effects of 
the medication (e.g., it would be negligent for a doctor to prescribe drugs 
that cause drowsiness to a bus driver without bringing the effect of the 
drug to the patient’s attention).75  
According to the majority: “Once a therapist does in fact determine, 
or under applicable professional standards reasonably should have 
determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he 
bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim 
of that danger.”76  
Dangerousness appears to be a requisite component of the duty to 
protect. That is, the decision appears to create a two-pronged duty: first, 
determine that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others; 
then, assuming that determination is positive, exercise reasonable care to 
protect the foreseeable victim(s) of that danger. 
Such an interpretation would have been easily married to the broader 
developments demanding objective criteria for involuntary commitment: 
if a patient is deemed dangerous, there exists a threat warranting the 
therapist to take protective action, either to initiate commitment 
proceedings or warn the victim, the authorities, or both. If the decision is 
made not to commit someone (e.g., because the patient is not exhibiting 
signs of a mental illness), a call to action nevertheless remains, likely in 
the form of a warning. If commitment is inappropriate and there is no 
one identifiable to warn, then the patient is not dangerous, as defined, 
and foreseeability is not present. That is, the basis for exercising the 
                                                      
73. Binschus v. State, 186 Wash. 2d 573, 579, 380 P.3d 468, 471 (2016) (quoting Taggart v. 
State, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 219, 822 P.2d 243, 255 (1992)). 
74. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343 (referring to the cluster of provisions in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts dealing with the requirement to exercise control, §§ 315–320). 
75. Id. at 343–44. 
76. Id. at 345. 
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police power—to protect public safety, which was the policy reason 
driving Tarasoff77—is inchoate. As applied to the therapists in Tarasoff, 
there was clearly a determination that the patient was dangerous but they 
failed to take appropriate action; a failed effort to have him committed 
fell short of the danger they foresaw. 
Unfortunately, the above analysis was not how the law was construed. 
Arguably, it is more consistent with the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Mosk, which would have limited the duty to warn to those cases in 
which the therapist does in fact predict violence.78 For Justice Mosk, 
liability would only arise if the therapist concluded that her patient was 
likely to be violent and took no steps to neutralize the threat of harm.79 
The reality was that the mental healthcare and legal communities 
responded to the expectation that therapists take steps to protect third 
parties in any event (i.e., regardless of whether the patient was a danger 
to others). Dangerousness was an afterthought, conflated with the 
concept of foreseeability. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the next 
section, dangerousness remained a crucial ingredient in analyzing 
whether the duty to protect exists in a given circumstance. 
II. TRENDS IN THE DUTY TO PROTECT CASE LAW AND 
REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF DANGEROUSNESS 
WITHIN IT 
A. Trend Spotting Among Tarasoff’s Progeny 
Forty years after Tarasoff, it is axiomatic to point out that the decision 
spawned a cottage industry of criticism and commentary. The mental 
healthcare community struggled to make sense of the decision and 
clinicians and lawyers pounced on the ruling’s many shortcomings. 
Among them were that the decision (1) falsely assumed professionals 
could predict a patient’s propensity for violence; (2) compromised 
patient confidentiality, undermining the therapeutic relationship; (3) 
invited increased violence, as those most in need of treatment would 
withdraw for fear of premature persecution; (4) spurred involuntary 
commitment proceedings, unlawfully hampering the mentally ill’s 
liberty interests; (5) chilled professionals from accepting the most in 
need, and potentially violent, clients; and (6) created confusion as to 
                                                      
77. Id. at 346. 
78. Id. at 354. 
79. Id. 
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what standard applied.80 Reflecting on the decision decades later in 
1992, Michael L. Perlin observed: “Its very existence has reshaped the 
configurations of mental health practice, and has altered the relationship 
between clinicians and public authorities.”81 In particular, it was reported 
that clinicians found the duty to protect jurisprudence “perplexing [for] 
its inconsistency and unpredictability.”82 Some cases were perceived “to 
make little or no clinical sense,” particularly those interpreting Tarasoff 
to create even broader obligations to a larger class of third parties than 
initially construed.83 
And yet, subsequent literature surveys of case law reveal a certain 
degree of consistency for finding as a matter of law that a duty to protect 
existed (or not). In their 1992 review for the Defense Counsel Journal,84 
Douglas M. McIntosh and Carmen Y. Cartaya reviewed two types of 
cases evolving from Tarasoff: claims predicated on allegations of a 
failure to warn and claims predicated on allegations of a failure to 
detain. Both claims comprised the same three basic elements: (1) the 
existence of a special relationship between therapist and patient, (2) a 
context in which the therapist controlled the patient to some degree (i.e., 
hospitalization), and (3) the therapist’s ability to predict dangerousness 
based on voiced threats to identifiable victims (i.e., foreseeability).85 
Their review revealed that liability narrowed considerably to the 
inpatient context, as the outpatient context exhibited “[a lack of] 
sufficient elements of control.”86 In other words, the authors recognized 
a spectrum of control: inpatients “surrendered” control to their providers 
                                                      
80. See Hafemeister et al., supra note 60, at 76–78; Matthew F. Soulier et al., Status of the 
Psychiatric Duty to Protect, Circa 2006, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. L. 457, 457 (2010) (citing 
references omitted). 
81. Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for 
the 1990’s, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 62 (1992). 
82. Hafemeister et al., supra note 60, at 76. 
83. Soulier et al., supra note 80, at 457 (discussing Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 
230 (1983); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980); Jablonski v. United 
States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
84. Douglas M. McIntosh & Carmen Y. Cartaya, Psychotherapist as Clairvoyant: Failing to 
Predict and Warn, DEFENSE COUNSEL JOURNAL 569, 569 (Oct. 1992). 
85. Id. at 570–71. 
86. Id. (citing Sellers v. United States, 870 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1989); Hasenei v. United States, 
541 F. Supp. 999 (D. Md. 1982); Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d, 676 
F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1982); Cooke v. Berlin, 735 P.2d 830 (Ariz. 1987); Bauer v. S.W. Denver Mental 
Health Ctr. Inc., 701 P.2d 114 (Colo. App. 1985); Garrison Retirement Home Corp. v. Hancock, 
484 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Bradley Ctr. Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 
1982); Estate of Mathes v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Littleton v. Good 
Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d. 449 (Ohio 1988); Yellen v. Phila. State Hosp., 503 
A.2d 1108 (Pa. Comw. Ct. 1986). 
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whereas outpatients did not. Providers in the outpatient context have “no 
right or ability . . . to control the conduct of the patient,” which the 
authors implied was insufficient, stating: “if control arguably is not 
present, the defense should prevail.”87 
As to foreseeability, the concept arose where there was a specific 
threat to an identifiable victim—which, it bears emphasizing, mirrors the 
dangerousness criteria for involuntary commitment. The authors referred 
to Brady v. Hopper,88 the famous case arising from an attempted 
assassination of then-president Ronald Reagan.89 In that case, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a Colorado district court ruling that 
the “specific threats to specific victims rule states a workable, reasonable 
and fair boundary upon the sphere of a therapist’s liability to third 
persons for the acts of their patients;”90 it added that “[u]nless a patient 
makes specific threats, the possibility that he may inflict injury to 
another is vague, speculative and a matter of conjecture.”91 In other 
words, the authors summarized, foreseeability only arises once there are 
direct threats to identifiable victims; prior to that, foreseeability is 
inchoate.92 
In his 1987 review, James C. Beck similarly reported that the triggers 
of recognizing the duty are the degree of control vis-à-vis the assailant’s 
inpatient/outpatient status and the foreseeability of violence.93 Beck’s 
foreseeability analysis was based on three factors, the presence or 
absence of which determined the degree of foreseeability: the patient’s 
history of violence, a threat to a specific person, and the existence of 
apparent motive. Where two out of the three conditions were present, the 
danger was “clearly foreseeable;” where one was present, the danger 
                                                      
87. Id. (citing Farwell v. Un, 902 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1990); Currie v. United States, 836 F.2d 209 
(4th Cir. 1987); Abernathy v. United States, 773 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1985); King v. Smith, 539 So. 
2d 912 (Ala. 1989); Fisher v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Paddock v. 
Chacko, 522 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 553 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1989); 
Wagshall v. Waghsall, 538 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)). 
88. 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983), aff’d, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984). 
89. Id. 
90. Id.  
91. Id. at 1338. 
92. McIntosh & Cartaya, supra note 84, at 571 (citing Sellers, 870 F.2d 1098; Cooke, 735 P.2d 
830; Vu v. Singer Co, 706 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1985); Cantrell v. 
United States, 735 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. N.C. 1988); Brady, 570 F. Supp. 1333; Morton v. Prescott, 
564 So. 2d 912 (Ala. 1990); Thompson v. Cty. of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980); Eckhardt v. 
Kirts, 534 N.E.2d 1339 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989); Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86 (Kan. 1983); Bardoni 
v. Kim, 390 N.W. 2d 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1983). 
93. James C. Beck, The Psychotherapist’s Duty to Protect Third Parties from Harm, 11 MENTAL 
& PHYSICAL L. REP. 141, 141 (1987). 
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was “questionably foreseeable,” and where none were present, the 
violence was “unforeseeable.”94 Of the eleven cases that fell under the 
“clearly foreseeable” category, ten courts found that the therapist(s) 
owed the victim(s) a duty to protect.95 Six of the ten cases involved 
outpatients. Of those, only two ultimately led to liability: Jablonski v. 
United States96 and Davis v. Lhim.97 
In Jablonski, Veterans Administration (“VA”) psychiatrists were 
liable for the death of a woman who was killed by a VA outpatient. 
Jablonski never threatened his girlfriend (the victim) but he had 
attempted to rape her mother a few weeks prior to the index offense.98 
The mother had contacted the police, who in turn contacted a VA 
psychiatrist about the incident and the outpatient’s potential 
dangerousness but the psychiatrist never passed along the message.99 
When Jablonski and his girlfriend arrived at the VA, he informed the 
intake psychiatrist that he had spent five years in jail for raping his 
wife.100 The psychiatrist suggested hospitalization but Jablonski refused. 
He did, however, accept outpatient treatment.101 Parenthetically, 
involuntary commitment was rejected on the basis that Jablonski was not 
suffering from a mental disorder, so defined.102 The psychiatrist did 
advise Jablonski’s girlfriend, who confessed to being afraid of Jablonski, 
to leave him but she refused.103 Two other psychiatrists assessed him and 
found that he was dangerous but not committable, and made further 
outpatient treatment arrangements, and a third psychiatrist told the 
girlfriend to stay away from him.104 She ignored the advice and returned 
to the apartment they had shared, where he murdered her.105 At trial, the 
therapists were found to be negligent in failing to transmit the message 
from the police, failing to secure Jablonski’s past medical records, and 
                                                      
94. Id. 
95. In the eleventh case, the court concluded that there was a duty to commit. See Currie v. 
United States, 836, F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987). 
96. 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983). 
97. 335 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), aff’d, 382 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), rev’d 
Canon v. Thumudo, 422 N.W.2d 688 (1988) (overturned on statutory immunity grounds in respect 
of the improper discharge and failure to warn allegations). 
98. Jablonski, 712 F.2d at 393. 
99. Id.  
100. Id. at 392. 
101. Id. at 393. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 394. 
105. Id.  
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failing to warn the patient.106 
In Davis, a former inpatient shot and killed his mother two months 
after he was released from the state hospital.107 He had been suffering 
from chronic paranoid schizophrenia but had no history of violence; the 
only evidence of a threat was in a two-year old emergency room note 
suggesting the patient was threatening his mother for money.108 The 
victim’s estate alleged that the patient was negligently discharged and 
that the victim was not warned that her son was a danger to her safety.109 
The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial court ruling against the 
hospital psychiatrist, finding, inter alia, that the defendant owed a duty 
of reasonable care to a third party who is foreseeably endangered by his 
patient, that the duty only extended to readily identifiable victims rather 
than the public at large, and that there was evidence to support a finding 
that the defendant should have known that the patient was a danger to 
the deceased.110 That decision, however, was subsequently overturned by 
the state supreme court on statutory immunity grounds.111 
Beck described Jablonski as unreasonable,112 and a 2010 Tarasoff 
case law review by Soulier and colleagues, among others,113 named both 
Jablonski and Davis as among the cases that were so problematic as to 
trigger legislative response.114 The criticisms of the two cases were 
obvious: in Jablonski, whatever delinquencies may have existed in the 
therapists’ management and care, it is hard to see how their conduct 
ultimately caused the victim’s death. After all, they made multiple 
warnings. In Davis, the issue was the (lack of) imminence of the threat. 
Even accepting, as Beck did, that there was some history of threats of 
violence, that history was years old and the patient was released months 
before the crime took place. Foreseeability may be broad, but Davis 
suggested a threshold bordering on indeterminate. 
Beck and Soulier and colleagues (among others)115 characterized two 
other cases as troubling outliers, which are an indefensible stretch from 
                                                      
106. Id. at 398. 
107. Canon v. Thumudo, 422 N.W.2d 688, 696–67 (Mich. 1989). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 699. 
110. Davis v. Lhim, 382 N.W.2d 195, 198–99 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), aff’g, 335 N.W.2d 481 
(1983). 
111. Canon, 422 N.W.2d at 700–01. 
112. Beck, supra note 93, at 142; Beck, supra note 62, at 671. 
113. See, e.g., Hafemeister et al., supra note 60, at 78. 
114. Soulier et al., supra note 80, at 458. 
115. See, e.g., Hafemeister et al., supra note 60, at 76–78. 
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Tarasoff: Lipari v. Sears116 and Petersen v. State.117 In these cases, the 
only two which Beck classified as “unforeseeable” and which imposed 
liability, the courts found that the danger “was so foreseeable that the 
duty runs to society at large.”118 These cases involved strangers who 
were harmed either by unprovoked attack or motor vehicle accidents. In 
Lipari, in response to a random shooting in a night club by an outpatient, 
a Nebraska district court found that a psychiatrist had: 
[A]n affirmative duty for the benefit of third 
persons. . . . [requiring a] therapist [to] initiate whatever 
precautions are reasonably necessary to protect potential victims 
of [the] patient. . . . when, in accordance with the standards of 
his profession, the therapist knows or should know that [the] 
patient’s dangerous propensities present an unreasonable risk of 
harm to others.119 
The Lipari court’s reasoning was in large part based on the special 
relationship under section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.120 
As to foreseeability, the court suggested that Tarasoff did not require the 
identifiability of the victim but acknowledged that its progeny limited 
the scope of the duty to identifiable victims.121 Nevertheless, it preferred 
another line of cases (unrelated to the psychiatric context)122 that 
professionals owed a duty to any foreseeably endangered person of the 
general public123—an expansive, if not the most expansive, 
interpretation of the duty.124 
In Petersen, Cynthia Petersen sued Washington State for injuries she 
sustained after a recently released inpatient from a state mental health 
hospital ran a red light and crashed into her car.125 Larry Knox was 
                                                      
116. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980). 
117. 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983). 
118. Beck, supra note 93, at 145. 
119. Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 193. 
120. Id. at 189. 
121. Id. at 194. 
122. See e.g., Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14, 18–19 (1965) 
(finding a physician liable to a third party for prescribing medication to a bus driver without 
warning the driver that the drugs could make him drowsy; the third party was a passenger on a bus 
driven by the patient that was involved in an accident). As Freedman points out, “the duty to the 
plaintiff was a duty that undeniably existed in the first place” given his knowledge of the patient’s 
occupation and his medication condition. See Freedman, supra note 5, at 272–74. 
123. Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 194. 
124. See James L. Knoll IV, The Duty to Protect: When Has It Been Discharged?, PSYCHIATRIC 
TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/challenging-cases/duty-protect-when-has-it-
been-discharged/page/0/2 [https://perma.cc/7RXH-76FC]. 
125. Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 422–23, 671 P.2d 230, 234–35 (1983). 
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committed one month earlier, after he castrated himself while high on 
angel dust.126 He was on parole at the time, conditioned on him not using 
illicit drugs. In the hospital, he was diagnosed with a schizophrenia-like 
reaction to drugs, and his period of committal was extended.127 Just prior 
to discharge, Knox was apprehended by hospital security for driving 
recklessly in the parking lot. Nevertheless, he was released the next 
day.128 Five days later, he crashed into Petersen.129 She alleged that the 
state failed to protect her from Knox’s “dangerous propensities,” and 
that the treating therapist should have sought additional confinement or 
disclosed his parole violation.130 At trial, the jury agreed, and ruled that 
the therapist was grossly negligent.131 The Washington State Supreme 
Court affirmed, relying on Lipari, and reasoned that the doctor knew her 
patient was “potentially dangerous,” and “would be unpredictable,” 
likely to experience hallucinations if he used illicit drugs, likely to use 
illicit drugs again, and yet failed to take any action.132 
The reviews by McIntosh and Cartaya, Beck, and Soulier and 
colleagues delivered variations on the same theme: fears of the effects of 
Tarasoff were for naught. Tarasoff, Lipari, and Petersen and their ilk, 
although worrisome, were true outliers, and most other cases provide 
reasonable assurances of the limits of the duty to protect. As Beck points 
out, the mere imposition of the duty to protect as a matter of law does 
not automatically result in a verdict that a therapist was negligent.133  
Beck’s position is far from academic. The Washington, California, and 
Nebraska courts all emphasized that the provision of (reasonable) care 
under the circumstances, based on professional standards of practices, 
will limit the imposition of so broad a duty to protect. On the other hand, 
as Soulier and colleagues acknowledge, the available case law hardly 
represents the universe of litigation involving therapists and third party 
victims. Their study dealt only with state and federal appellate cases, not 
trial court cases which were not appealed or those that never proceeded 
to trial.134 
But there is a more direct explanation for the curtailment of concerns 
                                                      
126. Id. at 423–24, 671 P.2d 235–36. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 424, 671 P.2d at 235. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 428, 671 P.2d at 236. 
133. See Beck, supra note 62, at 668. 
134. Soulier et al., supra note 80, at 467. 
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arising from Tarasoff: the precedential value of its progeny, particularly 
the more extreme cases, was short-lived. Therapists effectively lobbied 
state legislatures to enact laws to restrict those worrisome precedents and 
to provide clear guidance on the parameters of the duty to protect.135 
According to the Soulier review, thirty-seven states adopted legislation 
limiting the duty in one respect or another (e.g., requiring the 
identifiableness of the victim(s) or that the threat be “serious” and/or 
“imminent”).136 In particular, California’s involuntary commitment 
statute, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, was modified in 1985 to 
effectively codify the cases narrowing Tarasoff to identifiable victims of 
a specific threat, by immunizing therapists from liability “[e]xcept if the 
patient has communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of 
physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims.”137 
Nebraska similarly modified its involuntary commitment statute post-
Lipari, to preclude a cause of action against mental health providers for 
failing to warn and protect third parties except “when the patient has 
communicated to the mental health practitioner a serious threat of 
physical violence against . . . reasonably identifiable victims or 
victims.”138 
Petersen, too, was narrowed by the Washington Legislature.139 In 
1987, the state’s immunity statute, section 71.05.120 of the Revised 
Code of Washington, was amended to read as follows (in relevant part): 
(1) No officer of a public or private agency . . . attending staff of 
any such agency, nor any public official performing functions 
necessary to the administration of this chapter . . . shall be 
civilly or criminally liable for performing duties pursuant to this 
chapter with regard to the decision of whether to admit, 
discharge, release, administer antipsychotic medications, or 
detain a person for evaluation and treatment: PROVIDED, That 
such duties were performed in good faith and without gross 
negligence. 
(2) This section does not relieve a person from . . . the duty to 
warn or to take reasonable precautions to provide protection 
from violent behavior where the patient has communicated an 
actual threat of physical violence against a reasonably 
identifiable victim or victims. The duty to warn or to take 
                                                      
135. Id. at 458. 
136. Id. 
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2016). 
138. NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-2137 (West 2016). 
139. For a thorough critique, see generally Freedman, supra note 5.  
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reasonable precautions to provide protection from violent 
behavior is discharged if reasonable efforts are made to 
communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to law 
enforcement personnel.140 
Section 71.05.120 of the Revised Code of Washington narrowed 
Petersen’s duty to protect any foreseeable victim to warning identifiable 
victims; all other circumstances in managing a person’s 
institutionalization, apart from bad faith and gross negligence, were 
subject to that provision’s immunity.141 The broad duty that elicited such 
an outcry was effectively erased, state by state. Further, as Soulier and 
colleagues report, regardless of whether a state enacted a statute, courts 
“almost always found that defendants owed no duty to the public at 
large,”142 unlike the rulings of Petersen and Lipari. 
To the extent that there was some duty owed to society generally, it 
was better construed as a duty to commit. This was recognized by a 
Fourth Circuit Court case, Currie v. United States.143 In that case, an 
IBM employee, who was a Vietnam veteran with post-traumatic stress 
disorder, shot and a killed a co-worker and injured others, despite efforts 
by a VA treatment team to diffuse the situation.144 The treatment team 
was aware of the danger the man posed but they could not commit him 
since he was not suffering from a mental illness, so defined under North 
Carolina statute.145 Nevertheless, they warned IBM, as well as local, 
state, and federal authorities.146 The estate of the deceased alleged that 
the treatment team failed to commit the assailant, which gave the circuit 
court the opportunity to weigh the distinctions between the Tarasoff  
“duty to warn” and the (potential) duty to commit. The court stated: 
The duty to warn . . . runs only to identifiable persons within a 
recognizable zone of danger, and little resembles a general 
                                                      
140. See Act effective July 25, 1987, ch. 212, § 301, 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws 774, 775–76 
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120 (2016)) (emphasis added). Note that 
subsection (2) is now subsection (3) after a 2016 amendment that is not relevant to this paper was 
inserted as the new subsection (2). It is referred to as subsection (2) in this paper, for clarity and 
consistency with Volk, 337 P.3d 372 (2014). 
141. See Hahn v. Chelan-Douglas Behavioral Health Clinic, No. 27656–2–III, 2009 WL 
3765993, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2009) (noting that WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120(2) 
“does not create a duty to warn; it tells health care providers who fail to live up to the duty to warn 
that they will not receive the benefit of the immunity statute”). 
142. Soulier et al., supra note 80, at 470. 
143. Currie v. United States, 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987). 
144. Id. at 210–11. 
145. Id. at 211–12. 
146. Id. at 211. 
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responsibility for a third person’s conduct. A duty to commit, if 
there is such a duty, runs to all persons suffering foreseeable 
harm, whether or not those persons are subject to identification 
in advance.147 
Accordingly, therapists do not owe society a duty absent a basis for 
seeking a person’s commitment—that is, absent dangerousness. 
In all, the trajectory of the duty to protect, through the courts and state 
legislatures, reveals a few meaningful trends. First, after a broad and 
potentially unworkable start in Tarasoff, the duty to protect was largely 
reformed to the duty to warn. Second, the duty applies to therapists who 
not only have a “special relationship” with their patients, but also have a 
degree of control over them; where they do not, the duty is even more 
circumscribed. Accordingly, the outpatient context goes one step too far, 
particularly where indicators of foreseeability (e.g., past history of 
violence, specific threat, and apparent motive) are absent. Third, the duty 
extends to identifiable victims who are the subject of specific threats, not 
the general public. Finally—and I would argue most notably—the 
imposition of the duty to protect never strayed far from the objective 
criteria under the dangerousness standard. 
The circuit court’s comment in Currie, above, is illustrative. Assume 
the duty to protect can be construed as an umbrella under which 
therapists may take certain action depending on the circumstances, 
including initiating commitment of some kind and warning those who 
may be harmed and/or could prevent the harm from occurring. 
(Parenthetically, it is unclear what other options exist besides variations 
of these two, though courts always suggest there are others.148) Either the 
patient makes a specific threat to an identifiable person, prompting at the 
very least, a duty to warn, or the patient presents a general danger to 
others such that danger is reasonably foreseeable, prompting a duty to 
commit. If neither scenario can be played out, this means the duty to 
protect should not be triggered—danger is not foreseeable. 
B. Reflections on the Dangerousness Criteria: An Imperfect but 
Necessary Tool 
Though I argue that dangerousness is implicitly required in 
recognizing a therapist’s duty to protect others—or at the very least, that 
it ought to be—the reality is that Tarasoff and its progeny have been 
                                                      
147. Id. at 213. 
148. See, e.g., Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d. 421, 427, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (1983); Lipari v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980). 
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interpreted to require therapists to take steps to protect third parties in 
any event. It is conceivable that this was because California’s 
involuntary commitment statute provided the defendant-therapists in 
Tarasoff immunity from decisions regarding whether to commit or 
release a person,149 and thus, placed emphasis on the presence of 
dangerousness which could be construed as conflicting with that 
provision. But the Court drew no such link. Instead, the relationship 
between the duty to protect and dangerousness was left unclarified, 
emphasizing instead the traditional tort concept of foreseeability. This 
was despite the Tarasoff majority’s clear emphasis on dangerousness in 
recognizing the duty to protect. Recall that the Court held: “Once a 
therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional 
standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a 
serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger.”150 This 
begs the question: why did the Court choose not to explicitly set out the 
relationship between the duty to protect a patient’s potential victim(s) 
and the patient’s dangerousness? Any answer is purely conjecture, but a 
reasoned guess is that explaining the role the criteria plays in justifying 
intervention generally was far from a simple, or uncontroversial task. 
For starters, there is ongoing difficulty setting out precisely what 
dangerousness refers to. Definitions are legion, and defining the term has 
been called the most “vexing” issue.151 One definition often referred to 
includes four components: (1) magnitude of harm; (2) probability that 
harm will occur; (3) frequency with which harm will occur; and (4) the 
imminence of harm.152 But even with the benefit of that framing, 
questions abound. Does it include self-harm in addition to harming 
others? What will constitute a minimum level of harm? Must the harm 
be physical? What is the maximum length of time that qualifies as 
“imminent?” The list of unanswered questions is significant. 
In addition, there is the issue of accurately predicting an act of 
violence. Early predictive efforts were criticized, resulting in the 
psychiatry community developing standardized tests—such as actuarial 
                                                      
149. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 351 (Cal. 1976) (emphasis added) 
(relying on Cal. Gov’t Code § 856 (West 2017), which affords public servants such as the therapists 
“absolute protection” from liability for “any injury resulting from determining in accordance with 
any applicable enactment . . . whether to confine a person for mental illness”). 
150. Id. at 345. 
151. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 4, § 3-4.1 (referencing Harry Kozol, Dangerousness in 
Society and Law, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 241, 241 (1982) (“Dangerousness, as an attribute of human 
nature, has been the bane of man’s existence since time immemorial.”)). 
152. A.D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 680 (1974).  
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risk assessment instruments—to help clinicians evaluate the likelihood 
that an individual would become violent.153 Over time these tools have 
become more sophisticated, but they are far from precise.154 Debate 
continues over their accuracy, with experts in the field reporting that 
“virtually” all scholarship in the area agrees predictions are less accurate 
than chance.155 They are also laden with the value judgments of the 
person employing them. The therapist’s judgment is crucial to any 
evaluation, from whether to initiate use of the standardized risk 
assessment tools to the results they conjure. For these reasons, one can 
appreciate the difficult balance that must be struck in attempting to 
evaluate a mentally ill person’s potential for violence, and to not unduly 
rely on the very thing the dangerousness standard was meant to replace: 
professional discretion. The fact of the matter is that the legal standard is 
driven by medical judgment, causing the observation that, 
“[p]sychiatrists . . . are asked to make both clinical and legal 
determinations.”156 
There are also ongoing debates about whether the criteria achieves the 
aims set out for it. Some argue that the dangerousness criteria can be too 
broad, permitting commitment without clear evidence that serious 
                                                      
153. Gordon, supra note 141, at 672.  
154. Id. at 690; see also John Monahan, Tarasoff at Thirty: How Developments in Science and 
Policy Shape the Common Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 497, 504–55 (2006) (writing on the merits of 
predictions insofar as they are based on the presence of certain attributions associated with a 
propensity for violence (e.g., sex, age, prior history of violence, unemployment, etc.)).  
155. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra, note 4, § 3-4.2.1 (referencing the American Psychiatric 
Association’s position to the United States Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 
918–20 (1983) that two thirds of predictions of long-term future violence by psychiatrists are 
wrong. In Barefoot, two psychiatrists were called to testify during the sentencing phase of a man 
convicted for killing a police officer. Their evidence was that the man was likely to commit further 
acts of violence and would remain a danger to society. The jury sentenced the man to death and he 
appealed on the grounds that (1) it was unconstitutional to permit psychiatrists to testify about future 
conduct since they cannot predict the future and (2) these psychiatrists’ testimony was 
unconstitutional since they had never personally examined him. The majority disagreed on the basis 
that precedent authorized the testimony for the purposes of predicting dangerousness, which was 
relevant for sentencing. Further, expert testimony need not be based on personal examination to be 
admissible. Justice Brennan, dissenting, wrote that (unreliable) scientific evidence was likely to 
prejudice the jury, and must be held to a stricter evidentiary standard than permitted by the majority, 
specifically a stricter standard than the evidence was capable of meeting. Ten years later, in Heller 
v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993), the Court seemed to implicitly reverse itself insofar as it 
acknowledged the frailty of psychiatric predictive evidence (noting that “many psychiatric 
predictions of future violent behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate”); Donald H. Stone, Confine 
is Fine: Have the Non-Dangerous Mentally Ill Lost Their Right to Liberty? An Empirical Study to 
Unravel the Psychiatrist’s Crystal Ball, 20 VA. J. SOC’L POL’Y & L. 323, 337 (2011).). 
156. Gordon, supra note 19, at 679. 
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physical harm is imminent.157 This argument essentially takes issue with 
a broad notion of dangerousness, divorced from an imminence 
requirement and reliant on fallible predictive methods.158 By contrast, 
others criticize the criteria as too narrow, leaving people suffering on the 
streets because they are a threat to no one, yet clearly deteriorating.159  
This argument considers the deinstitutionalization movement of the 
1960s as partially failed, as not enough resources have been devoted to 
community care to capture those in need of support and treatment.160 
The result, it is argued, is that only middle class people with less serious 
disorders have benefited from the shift to community-based treatment, 
and lower-income people living with more serious illnesses (although 
not necessarily dangerous) end up in jail and/or prison.161 These 
criticisms boil down to policy choices, specifically whether to give 
primacy to therapeutic aims or individual liberties. Even if one believes 
(as I do)162 that these criticisms implicate solutions of a degree, not kind, 
they have merit. It is outside the scope of this Article to wade into the 
criticisms but it suffices to say that there are no simple fixes to resolving 
them, nor for finding a perfect definition of dangerousness or standard 
by which to test for its presence. 
Nevertheless, and despite its flaws, dangerousness as the governing 
standard is preferable to the alternatives. Commitment statutes require 
both the presence of mental illness and a consequence of the illness.163 
The alternatives are to change the consequence or remove it altogether. 
There is no viable consequence to authorize the use of the state’s police 
power that does not immediately conjure an even more problematic 
application than dangerousness. Public welfare, health, safety, or some 
other similarly-themed standard would be subject to the same predictive 
and definitional issues as dangerousness but would cast an even wider 
net, and be much more likely to falsely capture even more people, 
contrary to the move away from deinstitutionalization. The other option 
would be to return to a regime where commitment standards do not 
require a consequence and rely solely on a “need for treatment” or 
                                                      
157. See, e.g., D.H. Stone, supra note 155, at 326–30. 
158. Id. at 325. 
159. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 691–95. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 692–95; see also Jacobi, supra note 26, at 7. 
162. Greenberg, supra note 26 (where I argue that artful drafting can resolve seemingly 
intractable doctrinal conflicts, such as whether professional discretion-oriented beneficence and 
legalism are mutually exclusive means to achieving therapeutic aims).  
163. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 462–65. 
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similarly exclusively discretion-based threshold—a threshold rejected by 
the Court as running afoul of due process standards.164 Neither option is 
feasible. 
By contrast, the dangerousness standard emphasizes both the legal 
requirement of the provision of due process, and the corresponding 
necessity of balancing individual rights with broader societal interests. 
That balancing exercise limits intervention to only those circumstances 
where there exists a sufficiently strong governmental interest, such as 
the state’s duty to protect society from a discernable, serious danger.165 It 
also recognizes that civil commitment is a serious curtailment of civil 
liberties.166 In short, the Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty 
interests of the mentally ill; and any law impinging these rights requires, 
as Bruce A. Arrigo writes, “reasonably clear guidelines” as to their 
reach.167 In the duty to protect context, commitment may not be 
appropriate in every situation but it is implicit that some type of 
intervention is required. That intervention may indirectly trigger 
infringements of the individual’s liberty. For instance, informing 
authorities of a potential threat may invite an individual to be detained 
for questioning. Thus, the risk in divorcing dangerousness from the duty 
to protect is that it would invite indirectly what would be impermissible 
directly. 
To the last point, it must also be remembered that dangerousness is a 
construct, introduced for legal purposes, not medical ones. The 
development of the expertise of predicting future dangerousness arose 
out of the justice system’s need for evidentiary support in commitment 
determinations.168 As Michael A. Norko and Madelon V.  Baranaski 
write: 
[T]he need [for predicting dangerousness] did not arise as a 
result of clinical experience or wisdom, or of empirical 
evidence, or even the quest for testable hypotheses about human 
behavior and its antecedents. It arose out of pragmatic needs for 
criteria to make distinctions between patients appropriate for 
inpatient or outpatient treatment, or for voluntary or involuntary 
treatment, when those became real choices in the 1960s and 
                                                      
164. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).  
165. Freedman, supra note 5, at 265. 
166. See, e.g., D.H. Stone, supra note 155, at 325. 
167. ARRIGO, supra note 18, at 11 (referring to the hazy, imprecise language often used to define 
the meaning of “mental illness,” although the point applies equally to the broader notion that clear 
guidelines are required). 
168. Gordon, supra note 2, at 672. 
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1970s.169 
All of which is to say that regardless of whether dangerousness was 
intended to be a part of the Tarasoff analysis, it was designed for it. 
Specifically, it was designed to justify intervention on an objective basis. 
To the extent that it remains a flawed threshold for action, it bears 
emphasizing that an imperfect tool is better than no tool at all. Absent 
dangerousness, mental health providers face even greater difficulty 
performing their dual functions as healthcare providers and society’s 
protectors, and the difficulty undermines the autonomy and liberty 
interests of those they care for. 
III. VOLK V. DEMEERLEER 
A. Volk v. DeMeerleer: The Reignition of the Duty to Protect 
“Anyone” Foreseeable 
On July 18, 2010, Jan DeMeerleer entered the home of his ex-
girlfriend, Rebecca Shiering, and killed her and one of her sons; he 
attempted to kill another but the boy fended him off, fled and survived; 
DeMeerleer later killed himself.170 DeMeerleer had a long history of 
depression and bipolar disorder, and obtained treatment on an 
intermittent basis between 2001 and 2010 from Dr. Howard Ashby at the 
Spokane Psychiatric Clinic.171 Over the years, DeMeerleer expressed 
suicidal and homicidal thoughts to Ashby, the latter of which were never 
against his victims nor said in years.172 The last homicidal thought on 
record was in 2003 and directed toward his ex-wife, seven years before 
the index offense.173 There were a few disturbing instances implying a 
potentially violent streak, including striking one of Shiering’s young 
sons on one occasion, but otherwise no history of violence.174 On April 
16, 2010, during what would be his last visit with Ashby, DeMeerleer 
was struggling; he had lost his job and Shiering had left him; he 
expressed suicidal thoughts but denied an intention to act on it.175 Four 
months later he committed the index offenses. 
                                                      
169. Michael A. Norko & Madelon V. Baranoski, The Prediction of Violence: Detection of 
Dangerousness, 8 BRIEF TREATMENT & CRISIS INTERVENTIONS 73, 73 (2008). 
170. See Volk v. DeMeerleer, 184 Wash. App. 389, 394, 337 P.3d 372, 374 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2014). 
171. Id. at 395–96, 337 P.2d at 375. 
172. Id. at 395–407, 337 P.2d at 375–81. 
173. Volk v. DeMeerleer, 187 Wash. 2d 241, 386 P.3d 254 (2016). 
174. Volk, 184 Wash. App. at 417, 337 P.2d at 386. 
175. Id. at 405, 337 P.3d at 380. 
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Sheiring’s mother, Beverly Volk, and her surviving sons (together, 
“Volk”), sued Ashby and the Clinic for, inter alia, medical 
negligence,176  alleging failure to asses DeMeerleer’s suicidal and 
homicidal risk and provide treatment.177 Volk alleged that Ashby “might 
have prevented the attack” by mitigating DeMeerleer’s dangerousness or 
warning the victims.178 Ashby and the Clinic moved successfully for 
summary judgment dismissal on the grounds that they did not owe a 
duty to anyone in general or the victims in particular since DeMeerleer 
never threatened them in Ashby’s presence.179 Volk appealed, relying on 
Petersen and arguing that it was applicable and it did not require actual 
threats to an identifiable person before the duty arose.180 
A majority of the Court of Appeals agreed with Volk, and in so doing, 
re-introduced Petersen’s duty to protect “anyone foreseeable” to 
Ashby.181 It set out two issues on appeal. The broad issue was what duty 
is owed by a mental health professional to protect a third party from the 
violent behavior of the professional’s patient or client. The narrow issue 
was whether professionals hold a duty to protect a third person, “when 
an outpatient who occasionally expresses homicidal ideas, does not 
identify a target.”182 Notwithstanding its acknowledgement that Tarasoff 
was subsequently limited, that Petersen was the extreme extension of 
that case, and that section 71.05.120 of the Revised Code of Washington 
was amended explicitly to curtail Petersen, the majority held that the 
“limited duty to warn” identifiable individuals applied only to 
professionals in the involuntary commitment/inpatient setting; it did not 
preclude a broader duty in the outpatient setting.183 In its view, the state 
legislature saw fit to protect professionals in the one context but not the 
other.184 It also affirmed the summary judgment of Volk’s claim to the 
extent it related to Ashby’s failure to take steps to commit 
DeMeerleer.185 
                                                      
176. Id. at 394, 337 P.3d at 374. Other claims, which are outside the scope of this paper, include 
medical malpractice, loss of chance, wrongful death, loss of family members, and emotional harm 
resulting from the attack. Id.  
177. Id. at 407, 337 P.3d at 381. 
178. Id. at 407–08, 337 P.3d at 381–82. 
179. Id. at 408, 337 P.3d at 382. 
180. Id. at 413–14, 337 P.3d at 384. 
181. Id. at 425–26, 337 P.3d at 390. 
182. Id. at 413, 337 P.3d at 384. 
183. Id. at 425–26, 337 P.3d at 390. 
184. Id. at 426, 337 P.3d at 390. 
185. Id. at 425, 337 P.3d at 389. 
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Associate Chief Justice Brown dissented, concluding that the 
historical development of section 71.05.120 of the Revised Code of 
Washington narrowed Petersen in full and applied in all contexts, 
outpatient and inpatient alike.186 Justice Brown also reasoned that the 
duties owed under subsection (1)—to act in good faith and not with 
gross negligence—applied to any person reasonably foreseen to be 
endangered by the patient; whereas the “duty to warn or take reasonable 
precautions to provide protection” applied only to identifiable victims.187 
Volk’s allegations were limited to the latter provision, and thus outside 
the scope of the duty.188 In Justice Brown’s view, the statute clearly 
applied to the common-law duty, as both Petersen and the provision 
used the same language, namely “reasonable care to protect.”189 Ashby 
and the Clinic appealed. 
B. The Washington State Supreme Court Denies the Relationship 
Between the Duty to Protect and Dangerousness 
The Washington State Supreme Court upheld the “anyone 
foreseeable” standard but it departed from the appellate court below in 
its reasoning. Rather than engage with the role and meaning of 
section 71.05.120 of the Revised Code of Washington, the Court focused 
on the presence of a “special relationship” between Ashby and 
DeMeerleer as the singular and definitive basis for recognizing the 
presence of a duty to protect. Justice Fairhurst, writing for a five-person 
majority, relied heavily on Tarasoff and Petersen, and those cases’ 
reliance on section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.190 Justice 
Fairhurst stated that Tarasoff relied solely on an expansive reading of 
section 315, and was “not based on a hypothetical ability to control the 
patient.”191 In support of that position, Justice Fairhurst reviewed a 
number of control-based precedents and rejected each as applicable to 
the circumstances.192 Petersen was, in her view, “the most relevant 
analog to the present case,” and under that case, once a special 
                                                      
186. Id. at 438, 337 P.3d at 396. 
187. Id.  
188. Id. at 440, 337 P.3d at 397. 
189. Id. at 440–41 & n.4, 337 P.3d at 397. 
190. Volk v. DeMeerleer, 187 Wash. 2d 241, 255–56, 386 P.3d 254, 262–63 (2016).  
191. Id. at 257–58, 386 P.3d at 264. 
192. Id. at 257–58, 386 P.3d at 264–65. All of the cases were outside the mental health law 
context, dealing with analogous circumstances such as the dynamic between parole officer and 
parolee. 
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relationship is formed, a duty exists without regard for the “control” 
principle.193 After all, Her Honor held, the “nature of the relationship in 
Petersen gave the doctor unique insight into the potential dangerousness 
of his patient as well as the identity of the potential victim.”194 
Accordingly, where the special relationship exists, the “Petersen duty” 
applied, even in the outpatient setting.195 
Justice Fairhurst then weighed the policy considerations impacting 
whether to impose the duty. First, the inability to control a patient was 
rejected as militating against the duty on the basis that a number of other 
measures can be taken without it (though none were listed).196 Second, 
the public’s interest in being safe from assault weighed in favor of 
imposing the duty, as mental health professionals (MHPs) were the 
means by which “to identify and control such risk.”197 Reference was 
made to section 71.05.120 of the Revised Code of Washington for 
support of the professionals’ “broad responsibility to protect society 
against the dangers associated with mental illness.”198 Third, the concern 
about accurately predicting whether a patient represents a “substantial 
risk of physical harm to others” did not undermine imposition of the 
duty since the expectation was not perfection but rather the “standards of 
the mental health profession [required] to arrive at the informed 
assessment of their patients’ dangerousness.” Justice Fairhurst observed 
that “if predicting a patient’s dangerousness without at least some 
amount of accuracy was not possible, MHPs would not be entrusted to 
do so for civil commitment.”199 Fourth, the expansive duty’s threat to the 
twin goals of placing the patient in the least restrictive environment and 
safeguarding patients’ rights to be free from unnecessary confinement 
was downplayed, if not denied altogether. Justice Fairhurst 
acknowledged O’Connor, and the constitutionally-protected liberty 
interests of individuals, as well as the fact that institutionalization was 
not meant to serve as grounds for “dumping . . . people whose behavior 
might prove to be . . . offensive to society.”200 Nevertheless, the concerns 
tied to patients’ rights and interests were not borne out according to 
                                                      
193. Id. at 259–60, 386 P.3d at 265. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 261–62, 386 P.3d at 266. 
196. Id. at 263–64, 386 P.3d at 267–68. 
197. Id. at 264, 386 P.3d at 268. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 265–66, 386 P.3d at 268–69. 
200. Id. at 267–68, 386 P.3d at 269–70. 
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various scholarly references and case law, including Lipari.201 Therefore, 
that issue also favored imposition of the duty. Finally, concerns about 
the breach of patient confidentiality were rejected on the basis that the 
protection was “conditional and will yield to greater social interests e.g., 
‘to protect the patient or the community from imminent danger.’”202 
Justice Fairhurst went on to state that as to balancing the outcome, 
failing to recognize the duty owed by therapists to foreseeable victims 
“would foreclose a legitimate cause of action and would inform the 
victims that their rights are not worthy of legal protection against the 
dangerous conduct of mental health outpatients.”203 
As applied to Ashby, who conceded that he and DeMeerleer had a 
special relationship, Justice Fairhurst emphasized that Ashby knew 
DeMeerleer had suicidal and homicidal thoughts, had attempted suicide 
and other violence at different times, and appeared unstable at their last 
meeting.204 Nevertheless, Ashby did not arrange a follow-up 
appointment nor did he take other steps, such as performing risk 
assessments.205 Further, Her Honor wrote, although DeMeerleer did not 
identify his victims, Petersen did not require that he do so.206 Summary 
judgment was therefore inappropriate and thus, a genuine issue of 
material fact remained as to whether DeMeerleer’s actions were 
foreseeable.207 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Wiggins challenged the majority’s 
relationship-driven, control-free analysis as “unheralded,”208 and 
contrary to the explicit language of the Restatement209 and the case 
                                                      
201. Id. at 268, 386 P.3d at 270. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 273–74, 386 P.3d at 272. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 275, 386 P.3d at 281 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Indeed, the issue of control was not 
briefed by the parties or amici. See Petition for Review, Volk v. DeMeerleer, 187 Wash. 2d 241, 
386 P.3d 254 (2016) (No. 91387-1); Volk’s Answer to Howard Ashby, M.D.’s Petition for Review, 
Volk, 187 Wash. 2d 241, 386 P.3d 254 (No. 91387-1); Brief of Amici Curiae Victim Support 
Services the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI)-WA, Volk, 187 Wash. 2d 241, 386 P.3d 
254 (No. 91387-1); Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington Defense Trial Lawyers, Volk, 187 Wash. 
2d 241, 386 P.3d 254 (No. 91387-1); Brief of Amici Curiae Washington State Medical Association, 
et al., Volk, 187 Wash. 2d 241, 386 P.3d 254 (No. 91387-1); Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington 
State Association for Justice Foundation, Volk, 187 Wash. 2d 241, 386 P.3d 254 (No. 91387-1). 
209. Section 315 reads: “There is no duty to so control the conduct of a third 
person . . . unless . . . a special relation exists.”) (emphasis added). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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law—including its own very recent decision, Binschus v. Department of 
Corrections.210 That case emphasized the notion of control in applying 
the duty211—which meant Volk represented an unsupportable broadening 
of the duty owed to third parties.212 From its vantage point, the majority 
eschewed section 315 in favor of adopting section 41 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, despite the 
latter having yet to be adopted by any state (it has only been rejected), 
and without full and due consideration.213 The dissent would have 
affirmed the summary judgment dismissal.214 
C. Volk: Unsupportable, Unworkable, and Contrary to Policy 
With Volk, the Washington State Supreme Court has once again 
imposed on therapists a duty to protect anyone who might foreseeably be 
harmed by a patient, creating in essence, a duty to protect all of society 
rather than specific, identifiable individuals. The majority decision is 
problematic on many fronts—it is contrary to law, policy, and common 
sense. It places therapists in an even more untenable position than 
Petersen did insofar as it requires only the presence of a special 
relationship between patient and therapist and nothing more, namely 
dangerousness. In so doing, it prioritizes the interests of a hypothetical, 
unknown class of potential victims at the expense of the rights and 
interests of mentally ill persons—an unheralded departure in mental 
health law policy that was decades in the making. 
Among the primary issues with the majority’s legal analysis is its 
blinkered reliance on Petersen and its position that a special relationship 
was all that was required to establish the duty. First, Petersen is far from 
being “the most relevant analog” to Volk. Knox was a drug addict in 
violation of his parole and he exhibited dangerous behavior the day 
before he was discharged from involuntary commitment.215 Knox was 
doubly subject to state control, as an inpatient and as a parolee, and the 
therapist was found to be grossly negligent in her management of 
                                                      
210. 186 Wash. 2d 573, 380 P.3d 468 (2016). 
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Knox.216 By contrast, DeMeerleer had not exhibited or indicated 
troubling behavior in more than six years, and was not seeking treatment 
as an inpatient.217 Nor was Ashby subject to an allegation of gross 
negligence; the summary dismissal of allegations related to Volk’s 
negligence claim that commitment proceedings should have been 
initiated was affirmed on appeal.218 Further, as stated in the dissent, there 
was no basis for denying control’s relevance to the analysis. Its 
presence, as illustrated in the case law discussion above, indicates the 
therapists’ knowledge of the threat the patient poses—knowledge, the 
majority suggested, exists without it. 
This leads to the erroneous view that Tarasoff relied “solely” on 
section 315. As set out above, that case emphasized foreseeability as the 
most important criteria and, regardless of the outpatient context, the 
danger was clearly foreseeable; there was a specific threat to an 
identifiable victim and efforts to commit the patient were made. The 
California court may have relied on section 315 as authority for creating 
a relationship necessary to attach a duty to protect, but it was far from 
the only basis for doing so. In addition, it belies reason that the Volk 
majority, which repeatedly acknowledged Petersen’s involuntary 
commitment context, did not address its curtailment by the Washington 
State Legislature with the amendment of section 71.05.120 of the 
Revised Code of Washington. There is no question that that provision 
was intended to narrow Petersen.219 
Associate Chief Justice Brown had the correct interpretation; at the 
very least, it is the one consistent with the development of the duty to 
protect. He found that the duties owed under section 71.05.120(1) of the 
Revised Code of Washington—to act in good faith and not with gross 
negligence—applied to any person reasonably foreseen to be endangered 
by the patient; whereas the “duty to warn or take reasonable precautions 
to provide protection” under section 71.05.120(2) of the Revised Code 
of Washington applied only to identifiable victim(s). This is the 
codification of Currie v. United States: no broad duty to the public exists 
absent egregious circumstances of bad faith or gross negligence; only 
when a specific threat is made to an identifiable victim does the duty to 
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protect involve action beyond the commitment process. Otherwise, 
therapists would be held to a standard of care requiring use of a crystal 
ball. 
From a clinical perspective, the decision is equally faulty. The 
majority suggests that there are a number of “preventative measures” 
that can be undertaken to satisfy the duty, but apart from initiating 
commitment proceedings and warning victims, or their family and 
friends, or the authorities, none are provided.220 Warnings and/or 
informing others are only possible when victims are identified but none 
were identified in Volk (nor in Petersen, for that matter). There is no one 
to warn when no one is identified. Beyond that, authorities cannot take 
steps to protect “anyone foreseeable.” Even if one could, hypothetically, 
conceive of warning people in the patient’s life to prevent harm to 
“anyone foreseeable,” privacy laws would not permit disclosure. Under 
section 70.02.050 of the Revised Code of Washington, disclosure is only 
permitted if it will avoid or minimize an imminent danger to the health 
or safety of the patient or another individual.221 Likewise, the federal 
privacy statute, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 
permits disclosure of information arising under a patient-therapist 
relationship only where there exists a “serious and imminent threat.”222 
The majority described the privacy protection as “conditional and 
yield[ing] to greater societal interests.”223 However, that position fails to 
acknowledge that both state and federal legislatures circumscribed those 
conditions to instances where there is an imminent threat to an 
individual. The duty goes well beyond that, to situations which do not 
rise to the “serious and imminent” threshold. 
In addition, in failing to reconcile Petersen and section 71.05.120 of 
the Revised Code of Washington, there now exist two duties to protect—
one for professionals operating in the outpatient setting and one for those 
operating in the inpatient setting. Two issues immediately arise: First, 
what standard applies to a professional who operates in both settings? It 
is unclear. Second, how can the more onerous duty apply to those with 
less control and corresponding authority to act, even putting aside the 
statutory references to the contrary? Again, it is unclear. Beyond that, 
Volk places the outpatient-oriented professional in a catch-22: if he 
discloses his patient’s confidential information or initiates involuntary 
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commitment proceedings to avoid the risk of liability to a third 
(unknown) party for failure to protect, he faces liability from his patient 
for breach of confidentiality or unlawful confinement; if he does neither, 
the exposure simply reverses. Whichever path he chooses, the therapist 
is exposed to liability. 
Perhaps most disconcerting for practitioners is that there is no clear 
“trigger” upon which they are required to act. In their amici curiae brief 
in support of reconsideration of the majority decision, various state and 
national healthcare clinicians and hospital associations, whose members 
provide mental health services, point out that the duty arises 
automatically upon establishment of a relationship.224 There is no event 
or circumstance to demonstrate the presence of, in their words, “an 
imminent threat of serious harm.”225 No temporality exists, and 
therefore, no direct cause for intervention arises. That is, the majority 
removes the precondition of, in a word, dangerousness.  
But a broader, more pernicious problem arises: the denial of 
protection from unwarranted intervention born from the dangerousness 
standard. Alan Stone wrote of Tarasoff, “[T]here is little evidence in 
either [Tarasoff] decision of any recognition of the policy of protecting 
the rights of patients.”226 Indeed, the emphasis is entirely on public 
safety.227 The same is true of Volk. As much was made clear from Justice 
Fairhurst’s statement justifying the overriding of patient confidentiality 
laws on the basis that to do otherwise “would inform the victims that 
their rights are not worthy of legal protection against the dangerous 
conduct of mental health patients.”228 This statement speaks volumes 
because the Volk duty denies the necessity of dangerousness in the 
analysis altogether. Rather, from the vantage point of the patient, it is 
presumed that if she has a mental illness and a “definite, established and 
continuing” relationship with a therapist, she is necessarily a danger to 
others, and therefore subject to intervention of some kind at any time. 
Dangerousness then is a state of being rather than a construct—an 
approach repugnant to the precedents of Lessard v. Schmidt, Jackson v. 
Indiana, and O’Connor v. Donaldson. It is also plainly contrary to the 
trends in Tarasoff’s progeny emphasizing foreseeability and control—
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components indicating the presence of dangerousness. 
It is also troubling the degree to which the majority denies the 
potential impact of its ruling on the pressure to increase commitment 
proceedings. Justice Fairhurst denied that the original Tarasoff duty to 
protect led to increased commitment proceedings,229 which may be true, 
but it is hardly because that ruling and Petersen, in particular, were not 
serious threats to that development. Rather, those precedents were 
curtailed by subsequent cases such as Thompson v. County of Alameda230 
and Currie v. United States231 and legislative amendments such as 
section 71.05.120(2) of the Revised Code of Washington. In fact, the 
Fourth Circuit acknowledged in Currie, without an identifiable victim, 
commitment is the only option.232 And, as the Soulier review reported, 
some practitioners see commitment as preferable to breaching 
confidentiality obligations.233 
At the very least, the decision declares a winner between therapists’ 
dual roles treating the mentally ill and protecting society from the harm 
some may pose. It gives first position to anonymous, unknown, potential 
victims to whom no threat may ever be made or contemplated. Therein 
lies the rub: after decades building a legal framework that honors the 
rights and interests of the mentally ill, including establishing criteria for 
intervention that is a reasonable compromise between the hampering of 
their autonomy and the risk to society’s safety, Volk appears to suggest 
that the compromise is malleable rather than a constitutional 
requirement. The effect villainizes a class of people for the acts of a few 
that are no more foreseen than random acts of violence by someone not 
in treatment and therefore not subject to the same scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
With Volk v. DeMeerleer, the Washington State Supreme Court has 
once again invited serious scrutiny of the duty to protect third parties 
from mentally ill persons. That decision, like its predecessor, Petersen v. 
State, protects anyone foreseeably harmed by a dangerous patient—
except that the nature of the relationship between the therapist and 
patient is determinative, rather than the legal criteria of foreseeability 
and dangerousness. The result does away with the objective criteria 
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requiring intervention, namely the existence of a threat of serious and/or 
imminent harm to an identifiable individual(s) (i.e., dangerousness). This 
Article has argued that the consequences for this shift are significant: it 
creates bad law, jeopardizes good clinical practice, and most 
importantly, undermines the legalist, rights-based model of mental 
health law ushered in midway through the twentieth century. 
It must be remembered that dangerousness is a construct, not a state 
of being, and the duty to protect cannot operate fairly without it. By 
emphasizing the nature of the relationship between therapist and patient, 
rather than the presence of dangerousness, the message to the mentally 
ill is clear: you are inherently dangerous to others, and subject to state 
interference at any time. Not only is this contrary to constitutional 
precedent, it plainly contradicts the principles of autonomy and liberty 
underlying those historic cases. Volk invites a return to discretion-based 
treatment that denies persons with mental illness their rights; after all, 
Volk requires action before the due process associated with 
dangerousness is triggered. But the consequences go further: it is a 
regression to a time when the mere presence of mental illness was 
considered a threat to society, and those suffering were menaces 
warranting premature interference. 
In short, the Volk decision divorces dangerousness from the duty to 
protect, and it does so at the expense of the patient. However tempting it 
may be to deny due protection in the name of public safety, particularly 
in the face of gruesome crimes such as those committed by DeMeerleer, 
the judiciary and society generally ought not to conflate the rare actions 
of some with the states of mind of all. We ought not to presume that 
such actions are necessarily foreseeable—and therefore preventable—in 
the first place. Accordingly, Volk cannot remain good law. A motion for 
reconsideration was denied, and bills drafted for the 2017 state 
legislature session failed to pass.234 The current state of affairs cannot 
stand. Absent an unequivocal correction and clarification by the bench 
that “something more”235 is required than the mere presence of an 
ongoing therapeutic relationship, the legislature must act, lest the 
pendulum swing forcefully backwards. 
                                                      
234. H.B. 1810, 65th Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); S.B. 5800, 65th Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. 
(Wash. 2017). 
235. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). 
